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Abstrat
The lassial Three-Box paradox of Kirkpatrik [J. Phys. A 36 4891 (2003)℄ is
ompared to the original quantum Three-Box paradox of Aharonov and Vaidman [J.
Phys. A 24 2315 (1991)℄. It is argued that the quantum Three-Box experiment is a
quantum paradox in the sense that it is an example of a lassial task whih annot
be aomplished using lassial means, but an be aomplished using quantum de-
vies. It is shown that Kirkpatrik's ard game is analogous to a dierent game with
a partile in three boxes whih does not ontain paradoxial features.
1 Introdution
The Three-Box paradox is an example presented by Aharonov and Vaidman [1℄ of a pre-
and post-seleted quantum system that exhibits highly ounter-intuitive behavior. It has
beome the fous of a long-lived debate, inluding attempts to demystify and refute the
paradox (see, for example, [2, 3, 4, 5, 6℄). One suh attempt in partiular, presented by
Kirkpatrik [7℄, involves a lassial analogue of the Three-Box paradox in the form of a
ard-game. In this paper we analyze the paradoxial features of the Three-Box experiment
and argue that it does not have a lassial analogue. We analyze Kirkpatrik's ard game
and show that it does not reprodue the paradoxial features of the original Three-Box
experiment.
The paradox in the Three-Box experiment is that at a partiular time we an laim that
a partile is in some sense both with ertainty in one box, A, and with ertainty in another
box, B. Now, if a partile is ertainly in A, then it is ertainly not in B, and vie versa.
Therefore, if a single partile is both ertainly in A and ertainly in B we have a paradox.
The diulty is not unlike the one presented by a two-slit interferene experiment, where
we have to admit that a single partile passes simultaneously through two separated slits,
∗
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but it is more aute. In the Three-Box experiment, the partile is ertain to be found in
A if searhed for in A, and ertain to be found in B if searhed for in B instead.
Today we do not know of any real paradoxes in physis. A true physial paradox would
be a predition of a urrent physial theory that ontradits experimental results. Suh
a paradox would neessitate a modiation of the urrent theory, i.e. progress in physis.
What we mean by quantum paradox is a phenomenon that lassial physis annot
explain. The Three-Box paradox desribes a partiular task that annot be aomplished
using lassial means.
An example of this type of quantum paradox is the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger [8℄
(GHZ) setup modied by Mermin [9℄, in whih a team equipped with quantum tehnology
an win with ertainty a game with separated players that an be won by a team employing
lassial (relativisti) physis only with probability 0.75 [10℄. The GHZ game is one of
numerous games [11, 12℄ based on quantum entanglement, a phenomenon that enables
orrelations between remote observers that are stronger than those possible lassially
[13℄. The Three-Box experiment is one of the only quantum paradoxes whih do not
employ entanglement between remote loations, so it is a genuinely new paradox
1
. The
existene of a lassial system whih an perform the Three-Box task would remove the
paradox, and thus it is important to analyze the validity of Kirkpatrik's argument.
In the next setion we onsider some unusual properties of a pre- and post-seleted
spin-
1
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partile, in order to larify the main paradoxial feature of the quantum Three-
Box experiment desribed later in Setion 3. Setion 4 is devoted to a presentation of
Kirkpatrik's game as given in his paper. In setion 5 we strip Kirkpatrik's game of
those elements whih are not relevant to the analogy with the Three-Box paradox and
desribe other simple lassial games with similar properties. This allows us to show
that Kirkpatrik's game does not present a lassial analogue to the quantum Three-Box
paradox. Setion 6 onludes the paper with a broader view on related issues.
2 Paradoxial Features of the Pre- and Post-seleted
Spin-
1
2 Partile
In quantum theory, unlike lassial theory, an initial (or nal) state alone does not provide
all the information about a system during the time interval between two measurements.
For pre- and post-seleted quantum systems, a omplete desription is given by a two-state
vetor [15℄ that takes into aount both initial and nal states. This is the basis for all
the examples in whih we an make apparently ontraditory statements about a quantum
system at the time between its pre- and post-seletion.
For example, onsider a spin-
1
2
partile pre-seleted in the state |↑x〉 and post-seleted
in the state 〈↑z|. An intermediate measurement of σx or of σz is in either ase ertain to
1
One an also onsider Interation-Free Measurement [14℄ as a quantum paradox whih is not based
on lassially impossible orrelations. There, a gedanken devie is onsidered whih explodes whenever a
partile touhes it. Quantum strategy allows to detet the devie without it exploding.
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yield +1. The spin of the partile is ertain to be up in the x diretion if a projetion
measurement onto |↑x〉 is performed, and ertain to be up in the z diretion if a projetion
measurement onto |↑z〉 is performed.
A naive lassial analogy of a spin up in the x diretion is a lassial pointer, an
arrow, pointing in the x diretion. An arrow pointing in the x diretion ertainly does not
point in the z diretion, so apparently we have obtained a paradox of the kind assoiated
with pre- and post-seletion. However, it is not so, sine there is no lassial task involved.
Spin measurement is genuinely quantum, and within the framework of quantum theory
there is no paradox. For, when the spin is in the state |↑x〉, we annot laim that it is not
pointing in the z diretion; even without post-seletion there is a 50% hane of nding it
in the state |↑z〉.
An example of a situation that is paradoxial within the framework of quantum theory
is a pre- and post-seleted spin-
1
2
partile that is ertain to be up in the x diretion,
ertain to be up in the y diretion, and ertain to be up in the z diretion [16℄. Here
we disuss another paradoxial experiment; it is based on the mathematial struture of
the Three-Box paradox. Would you be surprised by the following? Suppose that we give
you a box, and arrange a single pre- and post-seleted partile so that:
If the partile is searhed for in a box with its spin up in the z diretion, it
is to be found with ertainty, while if the same partile is searhed for in the
same box with its spin down in the z diretion, it is also to be found with
ertainty.
These two properties are ontraditory not only in the naive lassial analogue (of an
arrow pointing in two opposite diretions) but also in standard quantum theory. The
usual eigenvalue - eigenstate link suggests that a partile whih is to be found with
ertainty, if searhed for, in a box with its spin up in the z diretion has the quantum
state |↑z〉, and thus annot be found in the box with its spin down in the z diretion.
It is possible for a pre- and post-seleted system to yield denite outomes for interme-
diate measurements that are not ensured by either the pre-seletion or the post-seletion
alone. Still, a situation in whih ontraditory outomes are obtained with ertainty, if
measured, is surprising. Let us show how this is ahieved.
The system onsists of a spin-
1
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partile and two boxes, A and B. The partile is
pre-seleted in the state
|ψ〉 = 1√
3
(|A, ↑z〉+ |A, ↓z〉+ |B, ↑z〉) , (1)
and post-seleted in the state
〈φ| = 1√
3
(〈A, ↑z|+ 〈A, ↓z| − 〈B, ↑z|) , (2)
where |A, ↑z〉 represents the partile in box A with spin up in the z diretion. We give
you box A and oer you to either look for a partile with spin up or to look for a partile
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with spin down inside. To do this, you have to perform an ideal projetion measurement.
Therefore, if you look for the partile with spin up and nd it, the partile's quantum
state after your measurement beomes |A, ↑z〉, but if you do not nd it, its state beomes
1√
2
(|A, ↓z〉 + |B, ↑z〉). The latter is orthogonal to the post-seleted state, however, so the
post-seletion annot sueed if the partile is not found. And beause the pre- and post-
seletions are symmetri with respet to the states |A, ↑z〉 and |A, ↓z〉, the partile is also
to be found, if searhed for, with its spin down in the same box.
Although this spin example is more ounter-intuitive than the previous one, it too
does not fall into the ategory of quantum paradoxes as dened above, sine there is
no lassial task involved. In both examples we disuss the results of spin measurements
whih are inherently quantum. The measurements in the seond example are partiularly
diult. In the rst example, a suitably oriented Stern-Gerlah apparatus an be used,
but in the seond example this is no longer appropriate - a Stern-Gerlah measurement in
box A would distinguish between all three states |A, ↑z〉, |A, ↓z〉, and |B, ↑z〉, and therefore
would not be a projetion measurement.
3 The Three-Box Paradox
The original Three-Box experiment [1℄ involves no spin, only a partile and three separate
boxes. The partile is pre-seleted in the state
|ψ〉 = 1√
3
(|A〉+ |B〉+ |C〉) , (3)
and post-seleted in the state
〈φ| = 1√
3
(〈A|+ 〈B| − 〈C|) , (4)
where the mutually orthogonal states |A〉, |B〉, and |C〉 denote the partile being in box
A, B, and C, respetively.
In between pre- and post-seletion, an observation takes plae either of box A or of box
B. A suessful observation of box A orresponds to the partile being found in the box
and is represented by the projetion PA = |A〉 〈A|. An unsuessful observation of box A
orresponds to the partile not being found and is represented by 1−PA = |B〉 〈B|+|C〉 〈C|.
Similar denitions hold for an observation of box B. As before, eah of the two intermediate
observations is ertain to sueed. Indeed, not nding the partile in A leads to the
quantum state
1√
2
(|B〉+ |C〉), and not nding it in B leads to the state 1√
2
(|A〉+ |C〉),
both of whih are orthogonal to the post-seleted state 〈φ|.
The Three-Box example an be presented as a lassial task whih annot be ahieved
using lassial means but whih an be ahieved using quantum preparation and veria-
tion measurements. Consider the following game. Alie, equipped with quantum devies,
prepares the partile in the system of three boxes and passes the rst two boxes on to Bob.
Bob, who is unaware of Alie's quantum mahinery, is told to look in one of the boxes, and
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that he wins if he does not nd anything. However, Alie gets to deide aording to her
post-seletion measurement whether the game ounts or not. Now, Bob has no a priori
reason not to agree to play; his hanes of winning appear to be 1/2. It is obviously so
before Alie performs the post-seletion measurement, and sine Bob is areful not to leave
any mark dislosing the results of his measurement, Alie apparently annot gain anything
from the post-seletion. Bob will nd, however, that Alie somehow manages to disard
all runs of the game in whih he does not nd the partile, and so Bob will always lose.
4 Kirkpatrik's Game
Kirkpatrik [7℄ laims that ...the Three-Box example is neither quantal nor a paradox...,
and supposedly demonstrates this by means of its reprodution in an elaborate playing
ard game.
Kirkpatrik's lassial system is onstruted using ordinary playing ards. Eah playing
ard has two marks, a fae (e.g. Jak, Queen, King) and a suit (e.g. Spades, Diamonds,
Hearts), and these are treated as system variables: Face (with values J , Q, K) and Suit
(with values S, D, H). The dek of ards is divided into two parts alled These and
Others, and the system onsists also of a memory M. Kirkpatrik denes the following
proedures, in whih a system variable is generially referred to as P and its values as {pj}.
Preparation. The system is prepared in a partiular state P = pj (e.g. Face = Q)
by (1) plaing all the ards with P = pj (i.e. all the Queens) in These and the remainder
of the dek in Others, and (2) setting the memory to the variable name M ≡ P (e.g
M≡ Face).
Observation. The variable P is observed in the following manner. If M = P , (1)
selet a ard at random from These and (2) report the value pj of the variable P of this
ard (i.e., its fae or suit). If M 6= P , then (1) selet a ard at random from Others,
(2) report the value pj of the variable P of this ard, and (3) prepare the system in the
state P = pj aording to the proedure dened above.
Partial Observation. In order to reprodue the Three-Box experiment, it should be
possible to perform a partial (as opposed to omplete) observation, in whih one observes
only whether or not the variable P has a partiular value pj . In a partial measurement of
P one selets a ard from the appropriate part of the dek (as determined by the ontent
of M) and reports the value pj if the ard's value of P is indeed pj , and p˜j if the ard's
value of P is not pj . If M 6= P , one prepares the system aording to the outome. To
prepare the system in the state P = p˜j , plae all the ards with P = p˜j in These and all
other ards (i.e., those with P = pj) inOthers. The variableM is, as before, set toM≡ P .
The role of the variable M is apparently to distinguish between repeated and new
observations. A repeated measurement is ertain to yield the same outome as obtained
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previously, whereas a new measurement (whih by denition must be a measurement of
the other variable) auses the system's state to be reset.
The need to dene partial observations has to do with the Three-Box analogue. In the
Three-Box experiment, projetion measurements are involved that measure only whether
or not the partile is in a partiular box. Suh measurements are onsidered to be partial,
whereas a omplete measurement would onsist of, e.g., looking in all three boxes.
The Three-Box analogue is supposedly obtained by hoosing the following six ards for
the dek: a Jak of Spades (JS), a Jak of Diamonds (JD), a Queen of Spades (QS), a
Queen of Diamonds (QD), and two Kings of Hearts ((2)KH). (The reason for two Kings
of Hearts is to have eah value of eah variable appear the same number of times in the
dek). The system is prepared in the state Face = Q. One of two partial observations of
the variable Suit then takes plae: either of whether or not Suit = S (orresponding to an
observation of box A) or of whether or not Suit = D (orresponding to an observation of
box B). Finally, a post-seletion measurement of Face is performed resulting in the nal
state Face = K.
The initial state Face = Q ensures that all outomes are possible in the following
observation of Suit (sine the JS, the JD, and the (2)KH are in Others). It is the
post-seleted, nal state that ensures that if the intervening observation was of whether
Suit = S, then the JS must have been seleted, and if it was of whether Suit = D, then
the JD must have been seleted. This is beause in the nal measurement of Face a KH
must be seleted from Others, and whereas in the states Suit = S and Suit = D the
(2)KH remain in Others, in the states Suit = ˜S and Suit = ˜D they are moved to These.
Therefore, given the post-seletion, the JS and the JD are eah ertain to be seleted,
and the system's intermediate state is ertain to be Suit = S and ertain to be Suit = D,
depending on what is measured. This, laims Kirkpatrik, is analogous to the partile in
the Three-Box experiment being found with ertainty either in box A or in box B.
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Figure 1: Kirkpatrik's ard-game. The initial Fae=Q state ensures that all outomes are
possible in the subsequent measurement of Suit. The nal Fae=K state requires that a
KH be seleted from Others in the nal measurement of Fae. This, in turn, means that
a JS must be seleted in a measurement of whether Suit=S, and a JD must be seleted in
a measurement of whether Suit=D.
5 Simpliation of Kirkpatrik's Game and Similar Pro-
posals
The large part of Kirkpatrik's game is extraneous to the Three-Box analogy. It is intended
to mimi quantum mehanial phenomena in a more general sense. In another work [17℄,
Kirkpatrik uses a modied version of the game presented here, laiming that it illustrates
the ordinary nature of muh of quantum probability, inluding inompatibility of observ-
ables, interferene, et. We are not pursuaded by his arguments, but the disussion of
these issues goes beyond the sope of this paper. We therefore onsider Kirkpatrik's game
without the ompliations of dening (and using the terminology of) system states and
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variables.
Consider a smaller dek of ards onsisting of a Jak of Spades (JS), a Jak of Diamonds
(JD), and a King of Hearts (KH), still distributed between two groups These and Others.
Suppose that initially all three ards are in Others. A ard is then seleted at random
from Others, and as before a partial observation is performed either of whether or not
it is a spade (i.e., the JS), or of whether or not it is a diamond (the JD). In either ase,
if the outome is positive, the seleted ard is plaed in These while the others remain
in Others. Otherwise, the seleted ard is returned to Others while the other ards are
moved to These. Finally, a ard is again seleted at random from Others, and our post-
seletion requirement is that this nal ard is the KH . This requirement ensures that the
previously seleted ard must have been the JS if spade was searhed for, and must have
been the JD if diamond was searhed for instead.
Figure 2: Simpliation of Kirkpatrik's game. Initially three ards JS, JD, and KH are
in Others, allowing for any of the relevant values of Suit to be seleted. The nal, post-
seletion requirement is that a KH be seleted from Others. Therefore a JS must be
seleted if it is searhed for, and that a JD must be seleted if it is searhed for instead.
Leifer and Spekkens [18℄ have suggested yet a simpler game to demonstrate this lassial
phenomenon. Their system onsists of a ball and a box. The box an be split into two half-
boxes, either length-wise or width-wise, by plaing a double partition inside and separating
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the resulting halves. The two half-boxes an be reassembled into a single box by joining
them together and removing the partition. The halves of one division are denoted front
and bak, and of the other, right and left. One measures whether the ball is in the
front half of the box by partitioning the box into front and bak halves and shaking the
front half to hear whether the ball is inside. If the ball is found in this ase, its left/right
position is randomized, but if it is not found then its left/right position is undisturbed.
Similar denitions apply for measurements of whether the ball is in the bak, on the right,
or on the left. Now suppose that this system is pre-seleted so that the ball is in the
front half, and post-seleted so that the ball is in the bak half, where the intervening
measurement onsists of looking for the ball either on the right or on the left. Then,
the ball is neessarily found in the intervening measurement, sine otherwise there is no
disturbane of the initial front state and no way for the ball to be transferred to the bak
half. Thus, the ball is ertain to be found on the right if that is where it is looked for, and
ertain to be found on the left if that is where it is looked for instead.
Figure 3: Leifer and Spekkens' game. The ball is pre-seleted in the front half and post-
seleted in the bak half. Its movement from the front to the bak ensures that the ball is
found in the intervening measurement either of whether it is on the left or of whether it is
on the right.
What these games have in ommon is that they use lassial measurement disturbane
to eetively enode the outome of the measurement into the system. In both ases, parts
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of the system are moved around in suh a way that the post-seletion beomes impos-
sible whenever the measurement is unsuessful. Obviously there is nothing paradoxial
about suh mehanisms, but neither are they equivalent to the Three-Box experiment. In
the Three-Box experiment, the intermediate observation onsists of just that - observa-
tion. A lassial system, on the other hand, is not disturbed by observation, therefore the
measurement must involve additional ations.
We an suggest another Three-Box experiment, or game, whih utilizes this kind of
lassial measurement disturbane and is entirely non-paradoxial. Suppose we put a
lassial ball in one of three boxes, and have another observer look inside either the rst box
or the seond. So long as the box is only observed, there is no post-seletion measurement
we an perform that will ensure the ball has been found. Therefore, let us have the observer
plae the ball in the third box whenever he does not nd it in the observed box. This makes
it is easy to ensure the ball is found by post-seleting that nally the ball is not in the
third box. It is this Three-Box game, rather than the original one, to whih Kirkpatrik's
game is analogous.
Figure 4: The Three-Box game to whih Kirkpatrik's game is analogous. Initially the ball
is in one of the three boxes. If the observer does not nd the ball in one of the rst two,
he moves the ball to the third box. The post-seletion is that the ball is not in the third
box.
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In all these games the observation inludes leaving a mark that is later read in
the post-seletion proess. The observation in the original Three-Box experiment, whih
onsists of opening a box, does not leave suh a mark in the framework of lassial physis.
Note that, ontrary to the supposedly analogous games, a suessful post-seletion in the
Three-Box experiment is possible even with no intermediate measurement (i.e., if none of
the boxes are opened).
6 Quantum Paradox and Beyond
The quantum Three-Box experiment, beyond its paradoxality, is very eetive in demon-
strating onepts that are related speially to pre- and post-seleted quantum systems.
While we agree (see [19℄) with Kastner [2℄ that in the Three-Box experiment there is no
ontologial property, or any kind of hidden variable, orresponding to the partile being
in box A, we believe that onsistent and useful operational denitions an be obtained for
the elements of reality [20℄ and weak-measurement elements of reality [21℄ assoiated
with the partile being in box A. The former orresponds to if observed in A, is to
be found there with ertainty, and the latter to the weak value assoiated with a weak
measurement [15℄ of the partile in A.
In the ase that we observe the partile in A weakly (i.e., with negligible disturbane),
these onepts beome partiularly useful, for it is then possible to weakly observe the
partile in B as well, at the same time. As it turns out, the elements of reality and
weak-measurement elements of reality are the same as if there were indeed two partiles,
one in A and another in B [22℄.
As we have shown, Kirkpatrik's system does not reprodue the Three-Box paradox
beause it ontains no ontradition. In [2℄, Kastner laims that the original Three-Box
experiment does not ontain a ontradition either. Her argument is that beause only one
of the boxes is atually observed, the properties of being in box A and of being in box B
annot be attributed simultaneously to the same single partile. Kastner argues that one
the partile is found, one annot onsider what would have happened had the other box
been observed instead. This implies that when the partile is found it atually beomes in
the box as a result of the observation, i.e., the measurement disturbane. Thus, although
Kastner does not dispute the quantum mehanial nature of the Three-Box experiment,
Kirkpatrik's game seems to provide a good demonstration of her argument.
Kastner and Kirkpatrik apparently have the following idea in ommon: that if dis-
turbane is understood to be inherent to measurement, then the diulty with regard to
the Three-Box experiment is removed. This view is shared by Leifer and Spekkens, who
show [18℄ that any attempt to reate a lassial analogue of the Three-Box paradox re-
quires measurement disturbane. But it is preisely beause the lassial observation in
the Three-Box experiment is non-disturbing that the experiment annot be explained by
lassial physis or aomplished using lassial means. This is what auses the Three-Box
experiment to be a quantum paradox.
This work has been supported by the European Commission under the Integrated
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